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CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

THE MILITARY TRANSGENDER POLICY: THE
REALIZATION OF MADISON’S INCOMPATIBLE
POWERS NARRATIVE
Ken Hyle†
Last summer, President Trump purported to ban all transgender
individuals from serving in the military via Twitter: “After consultation
with my Generals and military experts, please be advised that the
United States Government will not accept or allow . . . Transgender
individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. military.”1 In August
2017, the President followed his series of tweets with a Presidential
Memorandum that formally dismantled President Obama’s framework2
to permit transgender individuals to serve openly.3 These restrictions led
to a flurry of lawsuits in federal court.4 In March 2018, President Trump
issued a revised policy that aims to replace the categorical ban with one
† Ken Hyle is an active duty Air Force Judge Advocate currently assigned as an Assistant
Professor of Law at the United States Air Force Academy. The views expressed in this essay are
those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force,
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The author would like to thank the editors of the
Cardozo Law Review de•novo for their excellent work editing. The author welcomes comments/
feedback at Kenneth.Hyle@usafa.edu.
1 Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump) TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 6:55 AM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/890193981585444864; Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump)
TWITTER
(July 26,
2017,
7:04
AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
890196164313833472.
2 While the purpose of this essay is to address shortcomings in the constitutional analysis of
President Trump’s military transgender policy, my thesis applies equally to President Obama’s
unilateral decision to lift restrictions on transgender military service.
3 Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland
Security: Military Service by Transgender Individuals, WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 25, 2017), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-secretary-defense-secretaryhomeland-security.
4 See infra Section I.
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that is subject to some exceptions,5 but the lawsuits and the debate over
whether the policy is lawful continue.6
This essay highlights a critical shortcoming in the current
constitutional analysis of the President’s military transgender policy.
Part I outlines the constitutional grounds on which federal courts have
granted a preliminary injunction to enjoin the policy, highlighting how
the courts have relied exclusively on constitutional rights. Part II
presents James Madison’s historical narrative on incompatible
constitutional powers7 as a basis for discussing why any substantive
constitutional analysis of the policy must—at a minimum—address the
underlying separation of powers issue. I then argue that any legal
analysis of the President’s military transgender policy that does not
rigorously address the competing constitutional powers of the President
and Congress within this context brings us another step closer to
unfettered executive power.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS VS. CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS

The President’s transgender service ban, as derived from the 2017
Presidential Memorandum, has been interpreted to entail three distinct
prongs: (1) the Accession Directive; (2) the Retention Directive; and (3)
the Sex Reassignment Surgery Directive.8 The 2017 Presidential
Memorandum expressly stated that the President’s constitutional power
to issue the Directives is derived from Article II’s Commander in Chief
Clause.9 Plaintiffs, both current and aspiring service members who are
transgender, filed lawsuits in federal court to enjoin the directives on
various constitutional grounds.
In October 2017, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia granted a motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the
first two directives,10 holding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed
under the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.11 The opinion did not discuss whether the President had
the constitutional power to issue the directives,12 but did implicitly
assume that the directives were within the President’s constitutional
5 Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland
Security Regarding Military Service by Transgender Individuals, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 23, 2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-secretary-defensesecretary-homeland-security-regarding-military-service-transgender-individuals.
6 See infra Section I.
7 James Madison, Political Observations, NATIONAL ARCHIVES (Apr. 20, 1795), https://
founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-15-02-0423.
8 Stockman v. Trump, No. EDCV 17-1799 JGB (KKx), at 2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2017).
9 Presidential Memorandum, supra note 3.
10 Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 217 (D.D.C. 2017).
11 Id. at 215.
12 Id.
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power to “control the United States military.”13 However, the Court
failed to define the source and scope of the President’s constitutional
power to “control” the armed forces, and it is certainly debatable
whether the President has unilateral control over the armed forces.14
In November 2017, the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland granted a plaintiffs’ motion to preliminarily enjoin
enforcement of the directives.15 This Court also traced the plaintiffs’
likelihood of success on the merits to the Equal Protection Clause.16
While the opinion addressed the invocation of national defense interests
to justify enforcement of the directives, the Court dismissed this
argument in the course of a balance of equities analysis, and did not
address the specific allocation of constitutional power between the
President and Congress within this framework.17
In December 2017, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington granted a plaintiffs’ motion for a similar
preliminary injunction.18 This Court also focused its substantive
constitutional analysis on the merits of an Equal Protection claim.19
Strikingly, the opinion characterized the President’s actions as a
unilateral proclamation of a ban on transgender service members.20 By
doing so, the Court appeared to have some implicit reservations about
the President’s constitutional power to issue the directives without
congressional involvement. However, at no point did the Court squarely
address this separation of powers issue.
In another December 2017 case, the United States District Court
for the Central District of California also preliminarily enjoined the
directives.21 While this Court avoided any discussion of the President’s
constitutional power to unilaterally impose the directives, it did address
the issue of whether the Court should defer to executive branch
decisions related to the military (the “Military Deference Doctrine”).22
13
14

Id. at 194.
The U.S. Constitution does not expressly grant the President authority to “control” the
United States military. The Court presumably equated all aspects of military “control” with the
following power in Art II, Section 2: “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 1. However, such a presumption ignores the possibility that some aspects of military
“control” are reserved to Congress. For example, imposing restrictions on the composition of the
armed forces, which arguably falls under Congress’ Art I, Section 8 powers “[t]o raise and
support Armies” and to “make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12 and 14, could easily be considered part of the power to
“control” the military.
15 Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747, 772 (D. Md. 2017).
16 Id. at 768–72.
17 Id. at 769.
18 Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2017 WL 6311305, at *23 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11,
2017).
19 Id. at 7.
20 Id. at 6.
21 Stockman v. Trump, No. EDCV 17-1799 JGB (KKx), at 21 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2017).
22 Id. at 18.
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While the court ultimately declined to apply the Military Deference
Doctrine, and held that the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim was likely
to succeed on the merits,23 it skipped the first logical question a court
should ask before deciding whether or not to defer to an executive
branch decision related to the military: whether there is a source of
constitutional power for the President to make the decision in the first
place.
The above cases ultimately resulted in a nationwide preliminary
injunction enjoining the directives. However, after the President
released the revised 2018 Presidential Memorandum, which aimed to
replace the categorical ban with one that is subject to some exceptions,
lawyers for the President’s Administration argued that the legal issues
presented in the cases above were now moot.24
These arguments did not persuade the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington to lift the preliminary injunction.
The Court concluded that the 2018 Presidential Memorandum does not
moot plaintiffs’ claims because it prohibits transgender people from
serving unless they are “willing and able to adhere to all standards
associated with their biological sex.”25 But even in this most recent
case, the Court frames the substantive constitutional issues in terms of
violations of constitutional rights rather than a search for constitutional
power.26 This is noteworthy because, unlike the 2017 Presidential
Memorandum, which purported to be rooted in Article II’s Commander
in Chief Clause, the 2018 Presidential Memorandum cites only to “the
authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of
the United States of America . . . .”27 The White House is now
presenting the President’s constitutional power to issue the directives as
much more broad.
The common thread among these cases is a consistent failure of the
courts to analyze whether the President has unilateral constitutional
power to impose the military transgender policy. The next section will
explore, from a historical perspective, the dangers of missing this
crucial step in the substantive constitutional analysis.
II. JAMES MADISON’S NARRATIVE ON INCOMPATIBLE POWERS AND
THE MILITARY TRANSGENDER POLICY AS A MODERN-DAY OUTGROWTH
The balance of constitutional war powers has traditionally been
framed as tension between the President’s Article II power to conduct
23
24
25
26
27

Id. at 19.
Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, at 11 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2018).
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 3.
Presidential Memorandum, supra note 5.
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war as Commander-in-Chief28 and Congress’ power to declare war.29 As
James Madison noted in his 1795 essay Political Observations, “The
separation of the power of declaring war, from that of conducting it, is
wisely contrived, to exclude the danger of its being declared for the sake
of its being conducted.”30 This demarcation of power anticipated a
situation where the President might declare the United States to be in a
state of war when Congress was at recess31 and was designed to curb the
concentration of constitutional power in the executive branch.
However, this is just one of several sets of constitutional powers
Madison described as “incompatible” in Political Observations.32 To
understand the implications of Madison’s incompatible powers narrative
on the constitutional analysis of President Trump’s military transgender
policy, it is crucial to first discuss the historical context in which
Political Observations was written.
Madison wrote Political Observations in response to a key debate
he lost in the House of Representatives over a foreign affairs issue.
Madison, frustrated at the Royal Navy’s aggressive seizure of American
ships during England’s war with France, proposed a controversial bill
that would have placed substantial economic sanctions on Great
Britain.33 President Washington, fearing the repercussions would be a
war with Great Britain while the young republic was still fragile, instead
proposed that John Jay be sent on a special envoy to negotiate an end to
the crisis.34 At the same time, Washington asked Congress to increase
the size of the armed forces in case negotiations failed.35 On May 30th,
1794, the House took up a Senate bill entitled “[a]n act to increase the
Military Force of the United States, and to encourage the recruiting
service” (the “Military Establishment Bill”).36 The bill authorized the
President, at his discretion, to raise an additional 10,000 troops for three
years.37 Federalists argued that the bill would ensure military
preparedness if war broke out.38 Congressional Republicans, including
28
29
30
31
32
33

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
Madison, supra note 7.
Id.
Id.
James Madison on War and Liberty, THE SCHOLAR’S STAGE (Oct. 8, 2010), http://
scholars-stage.blogspot.com/2010/10/james-madison-on-war-and-liberty.html.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 3 Annals of Cong. 735–39 (1794).
37 Id.
38 Congressional records note that proponents of the Military Establishment Bill believed that
“the interests and safety of the United States might be materially promoted by our vesting the
President with the power to raise these men, if war should break out in the recess of
Congress . . . [w]ho would say, that if war should be forced upon us, this would not be considered
as a most valuable provision, because we might have this respectable body of troops engaged,
equipped, and prepared to act the moment that hostilities should be declared by the constituted
authority?” Annals of Cong., supra note 36, at 736–37 (emphasis added).
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Madison, feared the bill trampled on the basic constitutional principle of
separation of powers.39 It was this fundamental principle—the critical
evaluation of constitutional power—that Madison later articulated in
Political Observations.
Madison’s primary motive in writing Political Observations was to
counter the ironic accusations against him and those supporting
economic retaliation—as opposed to military action—as war hungry.40
But Political Observations also contained a deeper sub-narrative
involving the proper allocation of constitutional power among the
executive and legislative branches. Madison viewed the debate over the
Military Establishment Bill, particularly the federalists’ position, as a
dangerous step toward plenary executive power.41 He expressly warned
against a “gradual assumption or extension of discretionary powers in
the executive departments.”42
The constitution’s structure, Madison argued, created the necessary
barrier against this encroachment of power. In support of his argument,
Madison listed a series of incompatible constitutional powers.43
According to this narrative, there are certain powers that pose a threat to
liberty if surrendered by Congress to the President or from the President
to Congress. Madison was ultimately concerned that constitutional
analysis would develop in such a way as to view the lines separating the
incompatible powers as imaginary.44 He cautioned against efforts that
erode these lines, particularly in the country’s most unguarded
moments:
It cannot be denied, that there may, in certain cases, be a difficulty in
distinguishing the exact boundary between legislative and executive
powers; but the real friend of the constitution, and of liberty, by his
endeavors to lessen or avoid the difficulty, will easily be known from
him who labors to increase the obscurity, in order to remove the
constitutional land-marks without notice.45

Madison did not believe that perfect line-drawing between
executive and legislative power was feasible. Rather, he championed
constitutional analysis that both acknowledged the existence of such
incompatible powers and rigorously attempted to differentiate between
39 Congressional records note that opponents of the Military Establishment Bill believed “the
bill ought to be named ‘A bill authorizing the President to pass a law for raising ten thousand
men,’” and that “[u]pon the whole, [Madison] could not venture to give his consent for violating
so salutary a principle of the Constitution, as that upon which this bill encroached.” Id. at 735–
738 (emphasis added).
40 See generally Madison, supra note 7.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. “The Constitution expressly and exclusively vests in the legislature the power of
declaring war . . . raising armies . . . and creating offices.” Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.

2018] M I L I T ARY T R AN S G EN D ER PO L I C Y

66

these powers.
The President’s military transgender policy should invoke the
concerns expressed in Madison’s incompatible powers narrative. The
Constitution provides Congress with the power “to raise and support
Armies,”46 “to provide and maintain a Navy,”47 and to “make rules for
the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.”48
Historically, this umbrella of constitutional power has given Congress
discretion to set the parameters of the composition of the armed
forces.49 Congress has traditionally been the branch of government that
initiates large-scale policies involving qualifications for and conditions
of service in the armed forces, including the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
statute, which was both passed and repealed by Congress, then
presented to the President for his signature.50
The President’s military transgender policy, which places
restrictions on the makeup of the armed forces, was enacted without any
congressional action. The 2017 Presidential Memorandum asserts that
the President’s authority to issue the policy stems from the Commanderin-Chief Clause. As a result, the policy should raise an issue as to the
scope of executive power to unilaterally regulate the composition of the
armed forces, without a directive from Congress.
Unsurprisingly, Congress has previously asserted that the
Constitution reserves to itself the exclusive power to control the
composition of the armed forces.51 Under this reading, Congress must
first make findings and provide a statutory framework for the executive
branch’s decision-making process.52 On the other hand, it is also
arguable that the executive branch, by way of the President and the
Department of Defense, has constitutional power to unilaterally
promulgate military personnel policies that affect overall military
effectiveness.53 In light of this gray area of constitutional power, this
essay serves as a cautionary note to the courts that the President’s
46
47
48
49

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
See e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 654 (repealed 2010), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
USCODE-2010-title10/pdf/USCODE-2010-title10-subtitleA-partII-chap37-sec654.pdf; see also
Women’s Armed Services Integration Act, Pub. L. 80–625, 62 Stat. 356 (1948).
50 10 U.S.C. § 654 (repealed 2010), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE2010-title10/pdf/USCODE-2010-title10-subtitleA-partII-chap37-sec654.pdf.
51 Id. (“Congress makes the following findings: (1) Section 8 of article I of the Constitution
of the United States commits exclusively to the Congress the powers to raise and support armies,
provide and maintain a Navy, and make rules for the government and regulation of the land and
naval forces . . . .).
52 Id. “The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the standards for enlistment and
appointment of members of the armed forces reflect the policies set forth in subsection (b).” Id.
53 See e.g., DoD Retention Policy for Non-Deployable Service Members (Feb. 14, 2018),
available at https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD-Universal-RetentionPolicy.PDF (directing changes to military personnel policies necessary to provide more ready and
lethal forces).
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military transgender policy has led to a resurfacing of Madison’s
incompatible powers concerns. It is critical that the judicial branch
referee the competing constitutional powers of the political branches in
this realm.54
In fact, the military transgender cases involve the same set of
incompatible powers that Madison debated in the House against the
Military Establishment Bill and later highlighted in Political
Observations:
[Madison] thought that it was a wise principle in the Constitution, to
make one branch of Government raise an army, and another conduct
it. If the Legislature had the power to conduct an army, they might
embody it for that end. On the other hand, if the President was
empowered to raise an army, as he is to direct its motions when
raised, he might wish to assemble it for the sake of the influence to
be acquired by the command.55

As noted above, the current constitutional analysis of the
President’s military transgender policy is void of any substantial
analysis of whether the President has the unilateral power to enact the
policy.56 In the cases about the constitutionality of the policies, the
Courts have turned a blind eye to a potentially impermissible blending
of incompatible constitutional powers—the power “to raise an army”
and the power “to direct its motions when raised.”57 The Courts, as
Madison feared, have failed to even acknowledge an incompatible
powers issue when addressing the military transgender policy cases.
What, then, are the global implications of missing this step in the
54 The obvious counterargument for judicial intervention is the Political Question Doctrine.
See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). However, federal courts have rejected
categorical rules that ban or significantly restrict judicial review of separation of powers cases in
the context of military affairs. For example, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a separation of powers case,
the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed whether the Executive had the authority to detain citizens who
it determined were enemy combatants. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516-517 (2004).
Justice O’Connor expounded: “[W]e necessarily reject the Government’s assertion that separation
of powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for courts in such circumstances.” Id.
at 535–36. “We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens . . . ” Id. John Yoo, a constitutional
scholar who arguably takes a more rigid approach to the judiciary’s role in separation of powers
cases involving military affairs, acknowledges that, “[t]he exclusion of judicial review from the
decision of war does not exclude the courts completely from reviewing the prosecution of war.
When the war effort involves domestic affairs or, unfortunately, operations within the territorial
United States, the political branches may call upon the courts to play a role.” John C. Yoo,
Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427, 440 (2003). Under this
theory, the implementation of exclusion-based personnel policies in the military, such as the
President’s transgender ban, will either precede a state of war or occur after the initiation of war,
thus falling within the prosecution category. Furthermore, exclusion-based personnel policies in
the military have typically been interconnected with broader social issues impacting American
civilians, placing such policies within the scope of domestic affairs.
55 Annals of Cong., supra note 36 (emphasis added).
56 See supra Section I.
57 Id.
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constitutional analysis of the President’s military transgender policy?
Madison’s language in Political Observations reflects a profound
concern over the development of constitutional norms that perceive any
constitutional boundaries between incompatible powers as imaginary. I
would argue that Madison’s reference in Political Observations to “ the
real friend of the constitution, and of liberty . . .”58 is an allusion to the
judicial branch. As an early supporter of judicial review,59 Madison
envisioned the judicial branch as protecting the boundaries between
incompatible powers. Although Madison does not expressly invoke a
role for the judicial branch in Political Observations, there is language
within his incompatible powers narrative that suggests such a role. First,
Madison’s concerns over political influence and elections imply some
role for a nonpolitical, independent arbiter of constitutional power
disputes.60 Second, Madison alludes to a comprehensive deliberative
process for the establishment of precedent in constitutional power
disputes, which arguably suggests some involvement by a judicial body
with legal expertise.61 Under this interpretation, it is the responsibility of
the courts to protect against the establishment of constitutional norms
that treat the barriers between incompatible powers as imaginary.
Without the judicial branch policing this area of constitutional law, the
blending of incompatible powers might lead to unconstrained executive
power.
To illustrate, there is one arguably well-established set of
incompatible powers that have blended over time, leading to expansive
executive power: the power to declare or initiate war, which is
constitutionally committed to Congress,62 and the power to conduct war,
which is constitutionally committed to the President.63 Over the years,
the power to declare war has progressively shifted from the hands of
Congress to the President. In the present day, with these incompatible
powers thoroughly consolidated in the Executive, the current President
unilaterally directed the United States military to launch airstrikes

58
59

Madison, supra note 7.
See generally, C. Perry Patterson, James Madison and Judicial Review, 28 CAL. L. REV.
22, (1939).
60 “There are not a few ever ready to invoke the name of Washington; to garnish their
heretical doctrines with his virtues, and season their unpalatable measures with his popularity.
Those who take this liberty, will not, however, be mistaken; his truest friends will be the last to
sport with his influence, above all, for electioneering purposes . . . .” Madison, supra note 7.
61 “Nor will it be denied, that precedents may be found, where the line of separation between
these powers has not been sufficiently regarded; where an improper latitude of discretion,
particularly, has been given, or allowed, to the executive departments. But what does this prove?
That the line ought be considered as imaginary; that constitutional organizations of power ought
to lose their effect? No—It proves with how much deliberation precedents ought to be
established, and with how much caution arguments from them should be admitted . . . .” Madison,
supra note 7.
62 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
63 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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against targets associated with chemical-weapons capability in Syria.64
In a May 31, 2018 Memorandum Opinion, the Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) affirmed the President’s legal authority to unilaterally direct such
military action.65 The Memorandum Opinion unequivocally affirms a
constitutional norm by stating that “[t]he President’s direction was
consistent with many others taken by prior Presidents, who have
deployed our military forces in limited engagements without seeking
prior authorization of Congress.”66 In defining the scope of the
President’s unilateral war powers, OLC, an arm of the executive branch,
has deferred to the historic practice of courts declining to intervene
when these arguably incompatible powers have been consolidated in the
Executive.67 This historic blending of incompatible war powers
provides the President opportunities to exert great influence over
foreign and domestic policy without any meaningful legal constraints on
those powers.
Similarly, if the courts fail to rigorously address the blending of
incompatible powers presented in the pending military transgender
cases, the aggregate result will be quite remarkable—a new
constitutional norm that accepts that the executive branch would, in
practice, be empowered to unilaterally initiate war, direct that war, and
control the composition of the armed forces conducting that war. It is
time for the courts to reinforce the barriers between Madison’s
incompatible powers in order to check the rapid expansion of executive
power.

64 April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities, Memorandum Opinion
for the Counsel to the President, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, (May 31, 2018), https://
www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/2018-05-31-syrian-airstrikes_1-office-oflegal-counsel.pdf.
65 Id.
66 Id. The Memorandum Opinion references a number of historical examples of unilateral
Presidential military action to support its legal conclusion. See e.g., Authority to Use United
States Military Forces in Somalia, 16 Op. O.L.C. 6, 9 (1992); Proposed Deployment of United
States Armed Forces into Bosnia, 19 Op. O.L.C. 327, 331 (1995) (“In at least 125 instances, the
President acted without express authorization from Congress.”); Deployment of United States
Armed Forces to Haiti, 28 Op. O.L.C. 30, 31 (2004); Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35
Op. O.L.C. __, at 6 (Apr. 1, 2011).
67 Memorandum Opinion, supra note 64. In developing the historical practice doctrine, OLC
has applied a two-step framework to justify unilateral Presidential action. First, the proposed
military operations must serve important national interests. Second, the President’s use of force in
defense of important national interests must not constitute “war” within the meaning of the
Declaration of War Clause of the Constitution. Authority to Use Military Force in Libya,
OPINIONS OF THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL 1 (April 1, 2011). Curtis Bradley and Jack
Goldsmith have argued that this two-step framework provides no meaningful legal check on
presidential power. OLC’s Meaningless ‘National Interests’ Test for the Legality of Presidential
Uses of Force, LAWFARE, (JUNE 5, 2018), https:// www.lawfareblog.com/olcs-meaninglessnational-interests-test-legality-presidential-uses-force.

